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Abstract
This paper investigates micro and macro determinants of firms’ investment
behaviour using firm data from 101 developing and emerging economies. A
substantial number of firms in our sample does not invest in fixed capital or invests
little relative to sales revenue. Using a multilevel probit model we study what
factors trigger investment and using a multilevel Heckman selection model we study
what factors influence a firm’s investment to sales ratio. Although we find that both
micro and macro determinants explain investment behaviour, firms’ investment
behaviour is heterogeneous in nature and has little dependency on a country’s
macroeconomic setting. In addition, we find that, on average, firms which are
completely foreign owned have a relatively lower investment to sales ratio. Finally,
we find evidence which suggests that the probability of investing is higher for firms
located in countries with more property rights protection and control of corruption
and we find some evidence which suggests that foreign owned firms located in
countries with ‘good’ institutions invest relatively more.
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1 Introduction
Investors’ confidence in making a profit is fundamentally important to economic success
and long-term development. There is a large literature that investigates the role of risk
in determining investors’ willingness to invest and both the empirical literature as well as
theory concludes that uncertainty over future revenues influences investment behaviour.
Investment in fixed capital is particularly costly when investment is highly irreversible, i.e.
when investors are limited in their possibility to resell such capital goods because of the
firm-specific nature of investment or lacking second-hand markets for capital (Pindyck,
1991). As a result of high irreversibility of investment, uncertainty causes firms to delay
investment (e.g. Pattillo, 1998).
This study contributes to the literature by empirically exploring the extent to which
systemic uncertainties, e.g. related to countries’ institutional and political environment,
as well as other macroeconomic factors have an impact on firms’ investment behaviour.
An extensive macroeconomic literature suggests a strong relation between institutions
and political stability and investment (e.g. Everhart et al., 2009; Acemoglu and Johnson,
2005; Mauro, 1995). We assess the relative impact of these and other macroeconomic
factors on both the likelihood of investment and on firms’ investment to sales ratio.
In addition, this study aims at contributing to the literature by investigating the extent
to which private sector investment is influenced by firm-specific factors. We primarily
focus on determining the degree to which there may be advantages associated with foreign
equity ownership. If foreign investors have better access to finance, attracting foreign
investors (i.e. in terms of equity ownership shares) can be an important source for the
accumulation of capital. Yet, because cross-country microeconomic studies of the effect
of foreign equity ownership on investment are scarce, there is no or limited evidence
that provides an understanding of the extent to which firms with foreign ownership
invest relatively more or relatively less. On the one hand, foreign equity ownership may
decrease financing constraints and risks associated with investment and hence, foreign
ownership may be related to relatively high investment in fixed capital. On the other
hand, foreign investors may operate relatively more intensely in industries that require
less long-term commitments.1 And, if this hypothesis holds, we expect to see a negative
relation between foreign ownership and investment. Additionally, we investigate whether
there is a mediating effect of institutions on the relationship between foreign ownership
and investment. Again, we assess both the determinants of the likelihood of investment
and the determinants of firms’ investment to sales ratio. We expect that countries with
stronger protection of property rights and control of corruption are better able to attract
foreign equity.
Whilst on the basis of macroeconomic studies, it is difficult to empirically separate
foreign investment from domestic investment (e.g. Agosin and Machado, 2005), the
microeconomic literature has been more successful in determining the relative benefit
of foreign capital investment over investment under national control. For example, Koo
and Maeng (2006) finds that Korean firms with high foreign ownership have relatively
higher investment levels because foreign ownership decreases cash-flow sensitivity.2 We
1 One possibility is that foreign investors are relatively more dominantly active in or alongside
extractive industries and/or high growth industries which require large initial investments but are less
capital intensive over time. This hypothesis is merely tentative and more industry specific expertise is
required to outline the dynamics of foreign investors’ behaviour.
2 Koo and Maeng (2006) use GMM and firm data from 1992-2002. Investment is measured as the
ratio of capital expenditure at the beginning of each year over the capital stock at the beginning of each
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are unaware of previous studies on the effect of foreign ownership on investment in a cross-
country (firm-level) setting. Yet, several scholars do find a positive effect of foreign equity
ownership on firms’ performance, (Goedhuys and Srholec, 2010; Aitken and Harrison,
1999) and on firms’ innovative behaviour (Srholec, 2010).
If firms’ behaviour is influenced by the countries’ institutional-policy mix, and is
also determined by firm specific characteristics, to what extent is the investment level
of a firm determined by a country’s institutional environment? Furthermore, under
what conditions is an increase in private sector investment associated with foreign
equity ownership and other firm specificities? In order to reconcile evidence from the
microeconomic investment literature with evidence from the macroeconomic investment
literature, this study aims to unbundle firm-level and macroeconomic determinants of
investment behaviour. We use a multilevel model to take into account both the firm-level
and macroeconomic variation. To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first to
use investment data from a large sample of developing countries for this purpose.
In conformity with previous studies on investment in developing countries, we find a
high incidence of non-investment. As such, we resort to examine both the determinants
of a firm’s decision to invest and the determinants of a firm’s investment to sales ratio
in a multilevel context. On the basis of 101 countries and data for 45,580 firms and a
probit model we find no clear evidence of a (positive or negative) relationship between
foreign ownership and a firms’ decision to invest. However, a negative relation between
foreign equity ownership and investment becomes clearly visible following the results
of a Heckman outcome model that examines the determinants of a firm’s investment
to sales ratio. A predictor of country-specific effects is used to determine the effect of a
country’s overall macroeconomic context on investment behaviour. Our analysis indicates
a significant but relatively small impact of a country’s overall macroeconomic context on
investment (i.e. the likelihood of investment and the investment to sales ratio). This
finding highlights that firms are heterogeneous in nature and are relatively unconstrained,
in terms of investment, by a country’s macroeconomic context. We find a significant effect
of some macro-level variables on investment. For example, the likelihood of investment
is higher in countries with relatively stronger property rights protection and control of
corruption. Additionally we find a positive mediating effect of property rights protection
and control of corruption on the relation between foreign ownership and investment.
2 Literature Review
In this study we aim to assess specific micro and macro determinants of investment.
We focus on establishing the effect of foreign equity ownership and of institutions on
firms’ investment behaviour. These factors contribute to explaining a firm’s degree
of investment related uncertainty to the extent that foreign equity ownership and e.g.
property rights protection may help reduce investment related risk. The relation between
investment and uncertainty is described in real option theory. Real options investment
theory generally predicts a negative relation between investment and uncertainty because
high uncertainty is associated with high risk and therefore uncertainty causes investors to
reduce investment in fixed capital (Pindyck, 1991). Especially when investment is highly
irreversible, uncertainty can cause firms to delay investment. Overall, real options theory
outlines a micro-mechanism by means of which different factors that influence uncertainty
year.
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are related to investment.
Aside from foreign equity ownership and institutions, there are several other factors
that influence the investment uncertainty relation: e.g. risk attitudes (Nickell, 1978),
competition, financing constraints, and other macroeconomic factors. And, some of these
other factors may set-off a positive relation between investment and uncertainty. Likewise
on the basis of real options theory, Hartman (1972) argues that investment increases
with the marginal revenue product of capital. And, Abel et al. (1996, pp 754) argue
that “the future acquisition price of capital may be higher than its current acquisition
price” and thereby, under uncertainty, firms may be more limited in their possibility to
expand investment in the future. Several studies aim at determining the overall effect of
uncertainty on investment or seek to establish the effect of macro-level uncertainties on
investment. First, we proceed by providing a brief overview of the micro literature on
investment and uncertainty. Second, we provide an overview of the macro literature that
emphasizes the importance of the development of institutions for investment.
Empirical evidence on the effect of uncertainty on investment is inconclusive on
the direction of this relationship but largely suggests that the negative investment
uncertainty relation dominates the positive investment uncertainty relation (e.g. Fuss
and Vermeulen, 2008; Lensink et al., 2005; Green et al., 2001; Guiso and Parigi, 1999
and see also the literature review by Carruth et al., 2000 and meta-analysis by Koetse
et al., 2009). In particular, most evidence on the investment uncertainty relationship in
developing countries suggests that uncertainty (as well as irreversibility) has a negative
effect on investment. Here, researchers follow two distinct approaches. On the one
hand, researchers measure uncertainty using micro data; for instance Ninh et al. (2004),
Darku (2000), and Pattillo (1998) proxy uncertainty using firms’ expectations of future
sales, supply, and/or sales growth and Leefmans (2011), Shiferaw (2009), and Bo and
Zhang (2002) measure uncertainty using data on firms’ volatility of supply and/or demand
and/or labour costs. On the other hand, Kumo (2006), Aizenman and Marion (1999),
Serven (1998), and Serven and Solimano (1993) conduct a macroeconomic study where
uncertainty measurements include volatility of GDP growth, volatility of real effective
exchange rate, term of trade volatility, inflation.3 Alternatively, Bigsten et al. (2005)
find evidence for irreversibility by studying the dynamics of investment behaviour. Using
investment data on African manufacturing firms, Bigsten et al. (2005, pp. 22) show that
“firms refrain from investing during extended periods of time, rarely sell off capital stock,
and adjust slowly to a new long-run equilibrium”.
In addition to firm-specific sources of risk, it is likely that a country’s institutional and
political environment also influences investment behaviour. The role of macroeconomic
factors in influencing firm-level investment behaviour has already been discussed in the
work of Bernanke (1983). Examples of macroeconomic factors that drive investment
include shocks from property markets, agriculture, trade, and monetary, fiscal, and
regulatory policy (Bernanke, 1983). Several studies use microeconomic data to capture
the effect of firm idiosyncratic factors on investment behaviour but do not specifically
distinguish between idiosyncratic and systemic factors of uncertainty. Such studies rely
on controlling for macroeconomic effects by means of time dummies and fixed effects in
panel data analysis (for instance the work of Fuss and Vermeulen, 2008). Otherwise,
firm-level studies on investment are limited to a cross-section analysis of a given country.
3 Contrary to evidence on a negative uncertainty investment relation are the findings by Abdul-Haque
and Shaoping (2008) who measure uncertainty using data about Chinese stock market return volatility
and find that uncertainty positively effects investment.
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For example, Darku (2000) studies firm investment behaviour using a cross-section of
firms located in Uganda and interprets the negative uncertainty investment relation as
partly stemming from investors’ perceptions on macroeconomic policy i.e. privatization,
trade liberalization, taxation, and interest rates.
Aside from macroeconomic factors, a country’s institutional environment can arguably
play an important role in determining firms’ competitiveness and return to investment and
can potentially act as a major growth driver influencing investment, R&D, innovation,
and new business take-off. In developing countries where institutions are weak and/or
failing, investment risk is higher. If ‘bad’ institutions are a source of uncertainty, a weak
institutional development will negatively influence firms’ choice to invest and possibly also
firms’ investment level. In fact, the macroeconomic literature concludes that favourable
institutions and political stability are positively related to a country’s level of (foreign
and domestic) investment (Everhart et al., 2009; Daude and Stein, 2007; Acemoglu and
Johnson, 2005; Mauro, 1995).
There are few attempts in the literature to investigate the impact of (cross-country)
institutional factors on domestic investment on the basis of firm-level data. Asiedu and
Freeman (2009); Batra et al. (2003); Gaviria (2002) find a negative effect of corruption
on firm-level investment growth. However, because the authors measure investment
growth as the percentage of growth of investment over a three year period the data
does not capture the underlying structure of investment, i.e. frequent non-investment,
low investment levels, as well as lumpy investments.
Literature on firm-level evidence on the relation between institutions and foreign direct
investment yields more robust evidence on investment behaviour (Ayca; Javorcik and
Wei, 2009; Kinda, 2010; Kesternich and Schnitzer, 2010; Henisz, 2000; James R. Hines,
1995). One interesting study in this respect is the cross-country study of Javorcik and
Wei (2009), who specifically focus on the relation between corruption and foreign direct
investment (FDI). According to the authors’ theory, FDI and ownership structure is
influenced by corruption because corruption increases the cost of obtaining licenses and
permits. Javorcik and Wei (2009) also find that joint ventures can decrease transaction
costs associated with corruption. The study of Kinda (2010) likewise uses cross-country
firm data and finds a negative relation between some ‘institutional problems’ (e.g. firms’
perception on crime) and FDI.
3 Data
3.1 Micro Data
This study is primarily based on firm data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys
(ES).4 The firms included in the analysis are surveyed in the years 2006-2011 on the
basis of a comparable data collection method over countries. This ES data collection
is based on stratified random sampling with replacement where the strata are firm
size, geographic region, and sector; stratification reflects the non-agricultural economic
structure of each country.5 Our analysis (and overall the ES data) excludes firms with
100% public ownership and firms operating in the following sectors: utilities, financial
4 The data used in this study are collected from the ES ‘comprehensive’ dataset that combines various
country survey data sets.
5 The ES contain sampling weights but these weights were not used in the analysis mainly because
some of the weights are extreme, causing single observations to impact results.
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intermediation, real estate, and renting activities. The number of regions where surveys
are conducted differs across countries. A relatively larger number of surveys are conducted
in regions and economies that are larger in size and have a relatively high income level.
Overall, firm size is stratified according to the number of permanent employees: small
(5-19 employees), medium (20-99 employees), and large (100 or more employees).
Our dataset consists of 45,480 firms, 121 surveys, and data for 101 developing and
emerging economies (20 countries are surveyed twice). Table 7 in Appendix A lists the
countries considered in the analysis. By country, we also list the (fiscal) year(s), the total
number of firms and the number of firms that invest, the number of firms defined as
foreign owned, and the number of firms categorized by sector and by firm size. Overall,
the sample consists of a reasonable number of observations given the limited availability
of firm-level data that is fit for comparing developing countries. Nevertheless, because
the samples are relatively small we remain mindful that the country samples are merely
approximations for investment behaviour of each respective economy. As a result of item
non-response, miss-codifications and sampling errors a total of 14,759 firms are excluded
from the analysis.
Investment data collected in the surveys measure the total annual expenditure for
purchases of equipment and machinery during a given fiscal year. The definitions of the
firm-level variables are indicated in Table 8 in Appendix A. We code firms to have zero
investment whenever a firm indicated that it did not invest in fixed assets in the last
fiscal year and data on the amount of investment is also missing.6 Whenever investment
is larger than zero, our dependent variable (Investment) is equal to the natural logarithm
of the investment to sales ratio and hence excludes all observations with zero investment.
As shown in the first histogram of Figure 3 in Appendix A, Investment has a log-normal
distribution. Alternative measures for firms’ investment level used in the literature are the
natural logarithm of investment, investment as a ratio of the capital stock, and capital as
a ratio of labour. Because of ES data limitations we prefer the measure of investment to
sales over the later two alternative measures and prefer our scaled measure of investment
over the non-scaled measure. The dependent variable (i.e. investment and sales data) is
the biggest culprit of item non-response and causes the exclusion of 8,707 observations.
Still, overall, we expect that the item non-response follows a random process and does
not inflict serious bias.
In agreement with the findings of Gebreeyesus (2009) and Bigsten et al. (2005) on
investment in Africa, a significant share of firms in our sample of developing countries
invest close to zero or do not invest. The total number of firms that do not invest is
21,829; 52% of the firms in our sample invest. The average percentage of firms located in
Africa that invest is 45%. This percentage is lower than the average percentage of firms
that invest in Latin and Central America which is 56% and in Eastern Europe which is
60%. This pattern of non-investment is different from that documented by Lensink et al.
(2005) who use a sample of firms located in the Netherlands, out of which about 87%
have positive investment. In order to capture a firm’s decision to invest we construct a
6 From the sample of firms used in this study, 161 firms reported to not have invested but in fact did
report a positive level of investment. Another 232 firms reported to have invested (in either machinery
and equipment or land and buildings) but did not report the amount of investment in machinery and
equipment and neither invested in land and buildings. We expect that this (possible) bias does not affect
estimations because of the relative small number of occurrences. For methodological reasons, countries
(i.e. surveys) where none of the firms have positive investment are not included in our sample. Also, the
surveys for Nigeria-2007, Venezuela-2006, and Pakistan-2007 are not considered in the analysis because
of missing variables.
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binary dependent variable ‘Invest’. This variable is equal to 1 whenever a firm invests
and otherwise is equal to 0.
As already mentioned, many firms in our sample invest close to zero. When only
taking into account the firms that invest, the median level of investment—measured
as the investment to sales ratio—is 3%. Overall, this suggests that firms frequently
postpone investment, possibly because investment is largely irreversible. The distribution
of investment as a ratio of sales is plotted in the second histogram of Figure 3 in Appendix
A. To improve data visualization, a ceiling is placed on values where the investment to
sales ratio is higher than 1. Still, it is clear that the distribution is positively skewed
and has a long right-tail. Mainly because this distribution has such a strong degree of
skewness we prefer to measure investment as the natural logarithm of the investment to
sales ratio.
We measure the effect of foreign ownership using dummy variables. Because the effect
of partial foreign ownership on investment may be different from that of completely foreign
equity ownership on investment we experiment with a dummy which is equal to 1 if a firm
has any level of foreign equity ownership but not a 100% ownership share (P Foreign,
2,739 firms). And, we construct a dummy which captures the effect of whether a firm
has a 100% share of foreign equity ownership (Foreign100, 3,028 firms).7
We control for the effect of labour costs (wages, salaries, and bonuses) as a ratio of
sales revenue (Labour) and for the effect of a firm’s age (Age).8 Moreover, on the one
hand, we expect that the propensity of investment in fixed assets (including investment in
replacement equipment and machinery) is relatively higher for large firms than for small
firms. Large firms have a greater production capacity and are more able to redistribute
the cost of capital and adjustment costs over time. On the other hand, we expect that
the relative fixed cost of investment is higher for smaller firms than for larger firms, for
example because of scale effects. Therefore, in a given year, we expect that on average
smaller firms invest less in fixed assets than larger firms. As a proxy for size we use
the logarithm of the number of permanent full-time employees (Size). Observations are
excluded when the number of full-time permanent employees of the firm is less than five.9
Additionally, we control for the effect of firms’ access to foreign markets using the variable
Export. Export is a binary variable that is equal to 1 when a least part of a firms’ sales
are exported and that is equal to 0 when all the establishments’ sales are national.
The Enterprise Surveys are based on a range of difference industry classifications. We
adopt the following industry classification: (1) leather, garments and textiles, (2) food,
(3), metals and machinery, (4) chemicals and pharmaceuticals, (5) other manufacturing,
(6) retail and wholesale trade, (7) hotels, restaurants and other services, and (8)
construction and transportation and include these sector classifications as additional
dummy variables in the analysis.
Finally, three variables are used as controls for a firm’s decision to invest and as
selection variables required for the analysis on firms’ investment to sales ratio. These
variables measure the perception of a given firm/entrepreneur on obstacles that could
inhibit investment: access to land (Land), access to finance (Finance), and informal
7 The distribution of foreign equity shares is illustrated in Figure 4 in Appendix A.
8 Labour = ln(labour costs) - ln(sales); Age = ln(year in which the surveys were sampled - year of
establishment + 1). A small number of firms were established in the year the survey was conducted.
9 As a result of stratification difficulties, the variable used to stratify firms according to size does not
always correspond to the number of full-time permanent employees reported on the basis of the survey
analysis. We only exclude observations that are outside our sample population of interest.
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sector competitors (Competitor). We expect that entrepreneurs that are interested in
investing are relatively more concerned with obstacles related to finance, acquiring land
and competitors. We recode these variables as dummy variables where 0 represents no
obstacles, minor obstacles, or that the obstacle is not applicable to the firm. And, the
variables are coded 1 whenever a firm indicated the obstacles are moderate, major, or
very severe.
3.2 Macro Data
Why do firms invest less or less frequent in, for example, Angola than in Brazil? Why
do some countries attract more foreign equity than other countries do? In an attempt to
explain some of this cross-country variation in investment we explore the impact of macro
determinants on investment. We control for real GDP per capita (GDP ) in constant
prices, and growth measured as the logarithmic change in GDP with respect to the
previous year (Growth) from Heston et al. (2012) (chain series). Moreover, we control
for a country’s degree of de jure financial openness (Kaopen) using data collected by
Chinn and Ito (2008) (updated to 2010) and de facto trade openness (Openness) using
data from Heston et al. (2012). In addition, we control for the percentage of real interest
rates (Interest) using data from World Bank (2012).10
A country’s institutional development is measured using two proxies. First, property
rights protection (Property) is measured using data from the Heritage Foundation
(2013).11 Second, data from Transparency International (2011) is used to measure control
of corruption (CPI).12 In agreement with the macroeconomic literature on institutions,
we expect that investment is positively related to property rights protection and control
of corruption. We additionally use a proxy for political stability from Marshall and
Jaggers (2009) (Polity) in the regression analysis. Polity2 measures the degree to which
the political economy of a country approximates either a democratic or an autocratic
regime. Higher values of Polity2 correspond to more democracy. Because property
rights, corruption and political economy are closely related we do include these variables
in the same regression model.
Because of missing data the analysis with macro data excludes data on the following
countries: Afghanistan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of
Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Mali,
Montenegro, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Timor Leste, Togo, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu,
and Zimbabwe. Analysis using Property additionally excludes data on Iraq. Analysis
using CPI additionally excludes data on Samoa and Micronesia, and analysis using
the Polity2 data additionally excludes data on the following countries: Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Iraq, Micronesia, Samoa, Tonga, and Trinidad and Tobago. Unless indicated
otherwise, the micro data are matched with the macro data on the basis of the last
10 To avoid the exclusion of several firms from the analysis we replacing missing data on interest rates
in 2009 for Ecuador with data from 2006. And, we replace missing data on interest rates in 2010 for
Ethiopia with data from 2008.
11 To avoid excluding several countries because of missing data on property rights, we replace data
on property rights from 2009 for the missing observations of the following counties: Bhutan, Micronesia,
Tonga, and Samoa. Additionally, we use data from 2006 to replace missing data for Angola (2005 only)
and Burundi.
12 To avoid excluding several countries as a result of missing observations, we replace Transparency
International (2011) data from 2005 or 2006 for the missing CPI data for 2005 for Burundi, Mauritania,
Rwanda, and Swaziland. Also, we use data from 2005 for the missing CPI data for 2008 for Fiji.
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complete fiscal year in which investment and sales data are recorded - 1.13 As such,
we assume that (on average) when deciding whether and how much to invest firms are
sensitive to country-level signals from the preceding year.
4 Method
At this point, it is unrealistic to assume that a firm’s observed investment is independent
of country effects given our observed covariates. In particular, we wish to relax the
assumption that the effect of foreign ownership on investment is the same across countries.
On the basis of a random-intercept model we account for the nested structure of our
dataset and identify the extent to which firms’ behaviour is influenced by both firms’
specificities as well as by the macroeconomic and institutional structure of a firms’
country. The random-intercept model can also be referred to as a multilevel model, a
hierarchical model, or as a mixed effects model.14 The advantage of a multilevel modelling
approach is that we can estimate the degree of dependency of a firm on a given country
context. Also, the standard errors of multilevel models are more accurate than those of
a single-level model because they are dependent on the number of countries on the basis
of which we identify the country effects and they are not dependent on the number of
firms. A random-intercept model with level-one (micro) and level-two (macro) covariates
is given in equation 1.
y∗ij = β1 + β
′
2x1ij + β
′
3x2j + εij + υj
= (β1 + υj) + β
′
2x1ij + β
′
3x2j + εij (1)
Here the latent variable, investment, is denoted by y∗ij, where i represents a given firm
and j represents a given country. x1ij is a vector that contains the micro-level covariates
and x2j is a vector that contains the macro-level covariates. The total residual error
component contains a level-one residual and a level-two residual: ij ≡ υj + εij. We
assume that E(υj|x1ij, x2j) = 0 and that E(εij|x1ij, x2j, υj) = 0. Hereafter, the β1,
β2, and β3 are also referred to as ‘fixed’ parameters and υj is referred to as a ‘random’
parameter that remains constant within a country.
We produce a two-step Heckman selection model (type II Tobit) that takes into
account the non-linear nature of our investment variable that is caused by the high level of
non-investment as was discussed in section 3.1. The first step of the Heckman selection
model consist of a probit model that estimates the determinants of firms’ decision to
invest. Here, the decision to invest is summed as a binary dependent variable yij =
1[y∗ij > 0]. Following equation 1 and the probit model, the error terms υj|x1ij, x2j and
εij|x1ij, x2j, υj have a probabilistic distribution.
In the second step of the Heckman selection model we use a random-effect model to
estimate the determinants of firms’ investment to sales ratio. This second step of the
Heckman selection model is also referred to as the ‘outcome’ model. Here, yij = y
∗
ij ×
1[y∗ij > 0]. As such, the specification of y
∗
ij (equation 1) is different between the probit
and the outcome model (i.e. for step one and step two of the Heckman selection model).
In the second step, the Heckman selection model uses the so-called inverse Mills ratio
(λ) as an additional explanatory variable to correct for the fact that the probability of
investment is higher for certain types of firms. The inverse Mills ratio is computed on the
13 The last complete fiscal year of a firm is either one or two years prior to the data collection.
14 See for example the work of Greenland (2000) for an introduction to multilevel modelling.
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basis of the βˆ estimates of our probit model and corresponds to the respective ratio of
the standard normal density distribution function over the cumulative standard normal
distribution function: i.e. λ(z)= φ(z)Φ(z) .
In section 3.1 we already outlined three variables Land, Finance, and Competitor,
that may help control for the selection bias. These three variables are part of vector
x1ij in the probit selection model. Darku (2000), Bigsten et al. (1999) and Pattillo
(1998) also use a Heckman selection model to estimate investment levels. These authors
do not find a significant selection effect (of the coefficient of λ) in the outcome model.
To investigate the impact of the selection effect on our covariates of interest we also
produce random-effect models that do not include λ. Finally, in order to improve our
prediction of υij we use restricted maximum likelihood estimation, which in contrast to
unrestricted maximum likelihood estimation, corrects for the loss in degrees of freedom
and therefore does not suffer from downward bias in estimating the between-country
population variance (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008).
We are fairly comfortable assuming that, within the context of analysis, our analysis
on the effect of macroeconomic variables on investment does not suffer from endogeneity
problems. Specifically, it is unlikely that the investment behaviour of a single firm has
a significant influence on macro-level outcomes. However, as a result of unobserved
heterogeneity some of the firm-level explanatory variables may not be strictly exogenous.
For example, labour costs may be lower in underdeveloped countries that lack protection
in the form of formal labour rights and/or minimum wages and have lower educational
achievement. Moreover, some countries may have regulations that are beneficial for start-
ups and small enterprises which can stimulate such firms to invest more. Some scholars
find evidence that foreign equity concentration can have a positive spillover effect on
domestic firms (i.e. stimulating investment) as well as crowd-out domestic firms (i.e.
reducing investment). According to Aitken and Harrison (1999), in Venezuela, foreign
equity ownership negatively influences the overall productivity of domestic firms. And,
Kosova` (2010) studying firms located in the Czech Republic and Backer and Sleuwaegen
(2003) studying firms located in Belgium find that foreign firm presence increases domestic
firms sales growth and/or survival. However, both authors also find that foreign entry is
positively related to domestic firms exiting the market (indicating a short-term crowding
out effect). A Hausman test comparing a fixed and random effects model typically (as
in our case) yields a significant test statistic, thereby rejecting the random-effect model
over a fixed-effect model. In our case, we seek to identify macroeconomic determinants of
investment and we require a non-linear model in the first step of the Heckman selection
model and therefore a fixed-effect model is not a feasible option. However, the endogeneity
issue may be alleviated by the inclusion of the macroeconomic variables. We follow the
suggestion of Mundlak (1978) and augment our model introducing country means of
Labour, Size, Age, and of the percentage of foreign equity ownership in our analysis (i.e.
Labour, Size, Age, and Foreign).15 Hereafter, these country mean firm-level variables
are also referred to as the ‘Mundlak’ covariates. The covariates are part of vector x2j.
We expect that the macro covariates and ‘Mundlak’ covariates can act as controls for
the (possibly) endogenous firm-level variables and contribute to the estimation of the
corresponding within-effects.
15 Mundlak (1978) provides proof for the equivalence of a linear random-effect model with additional
time-averaged covariates and a linear fixed-effect model. The assumptions of Mundlak may not apply to
our context of ‘firm-series’ on a cross-section of countries and non-linear models and therefore we merely
expect that the ‘Mundlak’ covariates help alleviate endogeneity issues.
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For both the Probit and Heckman selection model we also empirically examine the
(possible) effect of institutions and political economy on the relationship between foreign
ownership and investment. Formally, we express this model as following:
y∗ij = β1 + β
′
2x1ij + β
′
3x2j
+ β4P Foreign×G ij + β5Foreign100×G ij
+ εij + υj (2)
P Foreign×G ij represents the interaction term between the binary variable P Foreign
(partially foreign owned) and either Property, CPI or Polity2. Foreign100 × G ij
represents the interaction term between Foreign100 (100% foreign owned) and either
Property, CPI or Polity2.
Most of the analysis in this study is based on a conventional random-intercept model
as presented in equations 1 and 2. Yet, in the final section of this study we augment
the model outlined in equation 2. Two additional random coefficients are included in the
model with the aim of identifying the extent of cross-country differences in the foreign
ownership investment relation. Here, in addition to the country specific-intercept, we
produce country-specific slopes for the binary variables P Foreign and Foreign100. The
random coefficient model is presented in equation 3. δ1j is the slope for P Foreignij and
δ2j is the slope for Foreign100ij. Empirically, the random effect parameters are expressed
in units of standard deviation and show the degree to which the intercept and the slope
coefficients are distributed around the estimated mean of each country.
y∗ij = β1 + β
′
2x1ij + β
′
3x2j
+ β4P Foreign×G ij + β5Foreign100×G ij
+ εij + υj + δ1jP Foreignij + δ2jForeign100ij (3)
5 Results
We begin the analysis by studying the effect of micro-level factors on investment
behaviour. Thereafter, we gradually include more variables to the models. First,
presented in Table 1 are the results of a probit selection model (model 1), a random
effect (RE) regression (model 2), and the results of a two-step Heckman selection outcome
model (model 3—referred to as ‘Outcome’). These models take into account the degree
to which firms are clustered by countries, i.e. the models are multi-level models. The RE
and outcome models are based on the selection of firms which report a level of investment
that is higher than zero. The difference between the RE model and the outcome model
is that the later model includes λ which is computed on the basis of the probit selection
model (model 1).
The results show that several of the covariates are highly significant in the probit
selection model and in the RE and outcome models. P Foreign is not significant in
models 1-3 and Foreign100 is not significant in model 1. The coefficient of Foreign100
has a negative sign and is significant in models 2 and 3. This result suggests that firms
that are completely foreign owned invest less, relative to sales, than domestic firms.16
16 In Appendix B are provided additional estimations using alternative measures of investment.
Overall, these analysis confirm that firms that are completely foreign owned invest relatively less.
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Based on this contrasting evidence, it is clear that the effect of foreign equity ownership
on investment is dependent on the degree of foreign equity ownership.
As expected, the coefficient of Age is negative, indicating that older firms invest
less in fixed capital. The coefficient of Export is positive and significant following the
probit selection model (firms that export invest more frequently). This coefficient is not
significant in model 2 and is positive and significant in model 3 (firms that export invest
relatively more). The coefficient of Labour has a negative sign and is significant in the
selection model but is significant and positive in model 2 and model 3. The coefficient
Size is significant in models 1-3; however the coefficient is positive in the probit model
and is negative in the models using Investment as the dependent variable. This result
means that larger firms invest more frequently than smaller firms but when smaller firms
invest, they invest more relative to their sales volume. Two of the selection variables are
significant and positive: the probability of investment is higher for firms that indicate
they face obstacles related to land and informal competitors. These positive coefficients
may indicate that firms that seek to invest are confronted by restrictions with respect to
access to land and market share. Additionally, a possible interpretation for the positive
coefficient of Competitor is that competition stimulates investment. The coefficient of
Finance is not significant. Model 3 includes the inverse Mills ratio (λ) which is used
to correct for the selection bias. λ is computed on the basis of the estimations of the
probit selection model in model 1 and has a significant and positive effect on the level
of investment indicating that the additional covariate λ statistically improves the models
fit. Following the multilevel models, when correcting for selection bias the sign of the
coefficient for Export turns significant.
Finally, we are interested in the estimates for the ‘random’ (unobserved) part of our
models. The population variance σ2υ (indicated as standard deviation συ) denotes the
variance of υj, the country-level random-intercept.
17 The log restricted-likelihood ratio
(LR) test statistics which test H0: σ
2
υ = 0 against Ha: σ
2
υ > 0 are significant for models
4-6 and thereby indicate the presence of country effects. The degree of significance of the
LR test statistics are reported next to the coefficients of συ.
ρ is an estimate of the residual between-country correlation such that ρ = σ
2
υ
(σ2υ+σ
2
ε)
where σ2ε is the variance of εij. We are particularly interested in the estimated values of ρ
which is an indicator of the degree of country dependency with possible range of [0,1].18
Following the selection model 1, ρ̂ is 0.12 and following the RE and outcome models the
ρ̂’s are 0.06. These results suggest that the variance at the country-level is much less than
the variance at the firm-level and thereby indicate that firm heterogeneity is relatively
independent of the country-specific context.
17 The significance of the ‘random effects’ is tested at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
18 ρ is also known as the variance partition coefficient and the measure of intraclass correlation.
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Table 1: Multilevel models with and without ‘Mundlak’ covariates
Dependent variable: Invest (models 1 & 4) and Investment (models 2, 3, 5 & 6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit RE Outcome Probit RE Outcome
selection selection
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Foreign100 -0.03 -0.19*** -0.21*** -0.03 -0.20*** -0.21***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Age -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Export 0.17*** 0.03 0.07* 0.17*** 0.03 0.06*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Labour -0.04*** 0.45*** 0.44*** -0.04*** 0.45*** 0.44***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.25*** -0.15*** -0.10** 0.25*** -0.15*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Land 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01)
Finance 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Competitor 0.04** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01)
Labour 0.17 -0.24* -0.21+
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Age -0.04 -0.40** -0.41**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Foreign 0.01** 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Size 0.17+ -0.11 -0.08
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
λ 0.41* 0.33
(0.21) (0.20)
Constant -0.82*** -1.62*** -2.12*** -1.03* -0.78+ -1.23*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.26) (0.40) (0.41) (0.50)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.36** 0.38** 0.38** 0.34** 0.33** 0.33***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
LR Chi2 2390.0 916.1 916.0 2142.9 608.3 609.4
LR df(1) *** *** *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.05
# of firms 45480 23651 23651 45480 23651 23651
# of countries 101 101 101 101 101 101
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
Up to now, we have assumed that macro-level covariates have an impact on the
‘random effect’ of a country and that these effects are captured by the intercept. We
further extend the analysis of the probit selection, RE, and outcome models by including
the variables Labour, Size, Age, and Foreign as additional controls. As explained in
section 4, adding the ‘Mundlak’ covariates to the models possibly reduces endogeneity.
These results are presented in models 4-6 of Table 1. Overall, we find that our variables of
interest are not sensitive to the inclusion of the additional variables. As a result of adding
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these country-level covariates the ρ̂’s decrease from 0.12 to 0.11 and from 0.06 to 0.05
depending on the model. Regarding the probit selection model, συ marginally decreases
from 0.36 (model 1) to 0.34 (model 4). With respect to the results discussed earlier, we
find no systematic change in the sign or significance of the other covariates presented in
model 1. Adding the ‘Mundlak’ covariates changes the coefficient of Foreign100 from
-0.19 to -0.20 in the RE model but the coefficient remains significant. Following the
results of the outcome model, the coefficient of P Foreign changes from 0.02 to 0.01 but
remains insignificant. Additionally, for the outcome model, we observe some marginal
changes in the coefficients of Age, Export, and Size.
Regarding the ‘Mundlak’ covariates, only the coefficients of Foreign and Size are
significant in the probit selection model. And, following the RE and outcome models
(5-6), only the coefficients of Labour and Age are significant. Here, perhaps the most
interesting is the coefficient of Age which in comparison to the coefficient Age is high and
negative. This result can be interpreted as an indication that countries with a favourable
investment climate have relatively more start-ups. The coefficient of λ, whilst significant
in model 3, is no longer significant in model 6. We find no major discrepancies between
the two models with the exception of the coefficient of Export which is significant in the
outcome model but is not significant in the RE model.
Following the results described above, country-level factors have a relatively stronger
effect on a firm’s decision to invest than on a firm’s decision on the relative level
of investment. Still, the estimated ρ are rather low suggesting a low country-level
dependency. As suggested by Hawawini et al. (2004) one possibility is that country-effects
are less pronounced because markets are to some extent economically and politically
integrated. Despite the relative low intraclass correlation, the LR test statistics computed
for the random-intercept models described above are all significant at p < 0.01 and
therefore are in favour of analysis including a country effect component. Moreover,
considering the context of analysis we still consider these ρ relatively substantial in size.
A 12% macro-level dependency on a firm’s decision to invest and a 6% effect on a firm’s
level of investment should not be understated when considering that these factors may
determine if a country chronically under-invests (or over-invests). These considerations
motivate further inquiry into the meaning of συ.
Table 2 presents the correlations between the estimate of υj of model 3 and model
6 (Table 3) and our country-level variables of interest. We find that the correlations
between υ̂j of model 3 and the macro-level variables aside from Openness, Growth and
Interest are rather high. υ̂j of model 6 are predicted values following the outcome model
that includes Labour, Size, Age, and Foreign as additional covariates. On average, the
correlations between υ̂j model 6 and the macroeconomic and institutional variables are
lower. For example, the correlation between υ̂j model 3 and Property is equal to -0.16
and the correlation between υ̂j model 6 and Property is equal to -0.14. The correlation
between υ̂j model 3 and Growth is low and negative but the correlation between υ̂j model
6 and Growth is slightly higher and positive. In conclusion, because the correlation
between several of the macro-level variables and υ̂j of model 3 and 6 are not close to
zero, these descriptive results support including the macro variables in the analysis as
additional covariates.
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Table 2: Pairwise Correlations between Countries
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υ̂j model 3 1
υ̂j model 6 0.88 1
Openness 0.03 0.05 1
Kaopen -0.30 -0.13 0.18 1
GDP -0.36 -0.13 0.36 0.50 1
Growth -0.01 0.04 0.16 0.11 0.37 1
Interest 0.04 0.03 -0.07 0.04 -0.17 -0.10 1
Property -0.16 -0.14 0.17 0.41 0.41 0.17 0.12 1
CPI -0.20 -0.08 0.24 0.42 0.54 0.23 -0.10 0.77 1
Polity2 -0.37 -0.20 -0.01 0.49 0.43 0.19 0.01 0.39 0.41 1
The number of countries (observations) used for each pairwise correlation ranges from 101 to 75.
Next, we include the additional macro-level variables Openness, Kaopen, GDP ,
Growth, Interest, Polity2, CPI and Property in the regression analysis. The
institutional and political indicators are entered separately in the analysis. We first
present the results of the probit selection models in Table 3. Model 1 presents the results
including Property, model 2 includes CPI and model 3 includes Polity2. The effect of
adding the macro-level variables to the model has little or no effect on the significance
and the magnitude of the coefficients of the micro-level regressors. As before, we find
no significant effect of foreign ownership on the probability of investment. Several of the
macro-variables are not significant. The coefficient of Growth is significant and rather
surprisingly negative. The coefficient of Interest is positive and significant in models
2 and 3. Additionally, we find a positive and significant effect of control of corruption
(CPI) and property rights protection (Property) on the probability of investment. The
coefficient of Polity2 is not significant. We test whether the coefficients of the country-
level variables are zero using a Wald test and reject this hypothesis for each of estimation
results presented in models 1, 2 and 3. Following model 3, the ρ is 0.10 which is lower
than the ρ documented in Table 1 model 4. We suspect that the decreasing effect of
adding additional macro-level covariates is not fully observable in models 1-3 of Table 3
because of the change in sample size.
In models 4, 5 and 6 of Table 3 we control for the effect of institutions (Property
and Corruption) and political economy on relation between foreign ownership and
the probability of investment. We find that property rights protection and control of
corruption have a positive mediating effect on the relation between completely foreign
owned firms and the probability of investment. This result can be interpreted as evidence
that foreign firms invest more frequently in countries that are (viewed as) having better
institutions. We find no significant effect of institutions and political economy on the
relation between partial foreign ownership and the probability of investment. The
coefficient of Foreign100 turns significant and negative in the models 4, 5 and 6 that
include the interaction terms. This indicates that the probability of investment is lower
for firms that are 100% foreign owned.
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Table 3: Multilevel Probit selection equations with macro-level
covariates and with and without interaction terms
Dependent variable: Invest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Foreign100 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.23** -0.23** -0.10*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04)
Age -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Export 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Labour -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Land 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Finance 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Competitor 0.05** 0.04** 0.05** 0.05** 0.04** 0.05**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Openness -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Kaopen -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP -0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 -0.07 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Growth -0.02** -0.02** -0.01* -0.02** -0.02** -0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interest 0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property 0.01** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00)
CPI 0.20*** 0.19***
(0.04) (0.04)
Polity2 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
P Foreign × Property 0.00
(0.00)
Foreign100 × Property 0.00**
(0.00)
P Foreign × CPI -0.00
(0.02)
Foreign100 × CPI 0.06**
(0.02)
P Foreign × Polity2 0.00
(0.01)
Foreign100 × Polity2 0.01*
(0.01)
Constant -1.48* -1.13+ -1.64* -1.46* -1.11+ -1.62*
(0.64) (0.61) (0.65) (0.64) (0.61) (0.65)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.37** 0.35** 0.34** 0.37** 0.35** 0.34**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Continued on next page
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LR Chi2 1642.1 1582.3 1491.7 1642.5 1586.9 1494.7
LR df(1) *** *** *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.10
# of firms 37471 37997 36691 37471 37997 36691
# of countries 77 76 72 77 76 72
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
Results for Labour, Age, Size and Foreign are available upon request
Table 4 presents the results of the RE and outcome models including the
macroeconomic and institutional variables. Again, Property, CPI, and Polity2 are
entered separately in the models. The various λ included in the outcome models are
based on the regression output of models 1-3 of Table 3. Unlike in Table 1 model 6,
where the coefficient of λ was not significant, the coefficient of λ is significant in Table
4 models 2, 4, and 6. As such, we give preference to the results presented in model 2
(including Property), model 4 (including CPI), and model 6 (including Polity2). With
the exception of λ, we find that the sign and significance of the coefficients of the micro-
level covariates are not sensitive to the addition of the macro-level covariates. Export
remains only positive and significant when correcting for sample selection bias.
No significant effect is found of Openness and Kaopen on firms’ investment to sales
ratio. The coefficient of GDP is significant and negative in all models which suggests that
firms located in countries with a relatively lower level of GDP per capita invest relatively
more in fixed capital. The coefficient of Growth is significant and positive in the RE
models that do not control for selection bias (model 1, 3, and 5) and is also significant
when controlling for selection bias and using Polity2 (model 6). In addition, Interest
has a negative and significant effect on investment in RE model 3 but this covariate
is insignificant in all other models. We do not find a significant effect of institutions on
investment when using the proxies CPI and Property. However, the coefficient of Polity2
is significant (following both model 5 and 6) and, somewhat contrary to expectations, is
negative.19 According to the work of Mathur and Singh (2013), one explanation is that
investment is driven by economic freedoms and not by political freedoms and that, as
a result of competing political interest, countries with emerging democratic institutions
may lack the ability to enforce economic freedoms.20
Table 4: Multilevel RE and outcome models with macro-level
covariates
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE Outcome RE Outcome RE Outcome
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Continued on next page
19 Estimation results for Table 4 using robust standard errors computed using maximum likelihood
estimation (instead of restricted maximum likelihood estimation) yield similar results. Wald tests based
of the estimations presented in models 1-6 reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the country-level
variables are zero.
20 Mathur and Singh (2013) studies determinants of FDI using a macroeconomic framework. The
authors’ theory may contribute to explain why, for example, China scores low on democracy and high
on property rights protection and is able to attract high flows of FDI.
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Foreign100 -0.19*** -0.21*** -0.18*** -0.20*** -0.18*** -0.20***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.15***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Export 0.02 0.10** 0.02 0.09** 0.02 0.08*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Labour 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size -0.15*** -0.04 -0.15*** -0.05+ -0.15*** -0.06*
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Openness 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Kaopen -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP -0.13* -0.14* -0.13* -0.16** -0.12* -0.11+
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Growth 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interest -0.00 -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
CPI -0.03 0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Polity2 -0.02+ -0.02+
(0.01) (0.01)
λ 0.86*** 0.78*** 0.68**
(0.20) (0.19) (0.21)
Constant -0.15 -1.54* -0.39 -1.48* -0.60 -1.79*
(0.58) (0.67) (0.58) (0.65) (0.63) (0.73)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.31**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
LR Chi2 437.3 447.8 471.1 481.2 442.4 446.5
LR df(1) *** *** *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
# of firms 19978 19978 20143 20143 19571 19571
# of countries 77 77 76 76 72 72
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
Results for Labour, Age, Size and Foreign are available upon request
Table 5, models 1-6 present the results of the multilevel selection models that
include the macro variables and the interaction terms for foreign ownership and
institutions/political economy. The λ included in the outcome models are based on
the probit selection models 4-6 of Table 3. Adding the interaction terms to the models
has some effect on the coefficient of P Foreign but does not systematically change the
other micro-level covariates. In contrast to the findings previously discussed, we find that
the coefficient of P Foreign is significant and negative in the RE model that includes
the interaction term for P Foreign and CPI. In the outcome model and the models
including Property and Polity2 as covariates we do not find any evidence that partially
foreign owned firms invest less relative to sales. The coefficient of Foreign100 remains
significant and negative in all models. Similar to the results presented in Table 5 we find
that, overall, growth is positively related to investment and GDP is negatively related
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to investment. Moreover, the coefficient of Polity2 remains significant and negative in
models 5-6 of Table 6 and the coefficients of CPI and Property remain insignificant.
The interaction terms P Foreign × CPI (models 3 and 4) and Foreign100 ×
Property (model 2 only) are significant and positive but the other interaction terms
are not significant. Hence, in agreement with some scholars (Asiedu and Lien, 2011;
Kinda, 2010; Javorcik and Wei, 2009) that study the effect of governance on FDI, we find
some evidence which suggests that countries with low corruption can attract more foreign
capital. We also find weak evidence indicating that firms with 100 percent foreign equity
ownership avoid investing in countries with poor protection of property rights. Based on
our sample, countries that score relatively high on the variables CPI and Property are
Chile, Estonia and Uruguay and countries that score relatively low on these variables are
Angola, Chad and Venezuela.
Across country-level averages, what is the relation between foreign equity ownership
and investment? The analysis including the additional random slope parameters are
presented in models 1-6 of Table 6. The random slope effects are expressed in units
of standard deviation with respect to P Foreign and Foreign100. We refer to these
random effect estimates as σP Foreign and σForeign100. The random effect estimates are
distinctly estimated (i.e. we allow for covariance). The join LR test statistics are
significant (even though the resulting p-values are conservative) and thereby indicate
cross-country differences in σP Foreign and σForeign100. Models 2, 4, and 6 build upon the
inverse Mills ratios computed following the estimation results of probit selection models
with interaction terms (4, 5 and 6) of Table 3.
The inclusion of the additional random coefficients has some effect on the magnitude
of the coefficients but does not influence our interpretation. The interaction term
Foreign100×Property in model 2 (including λ) and the interaction terms P Foreign×
CPI (models 3-4) remain significant. Also, we find some positive and significant effect
of Openness following models 1 and 3 that do not include λ (the coefficients are close
to zero). The inverse mills ratio, the coefficient of λ is significant in models 2, 4, and 6
and as such we prefer these estimation results over those presented in models 1, 3, and 5.
In comparison to the results presented in Table 5, we do not find any other systematic
differences in the estimation results.21
Next, we compute the—full—conditional marginal effects of foreign ownership on
investment. These results are presented in the line plots Figures 1 and 2. The point
estimates are based on the results of models 2, 4, and 6 presented in Table 6 which include
random-coefficients. We estimate the marginal effect of P Foreign on Investment and
of Foreign100 on Investment given different values of Property, CPI, or Polity2. We
use the values that correspond to the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles of the
institutional and political economy indicators that are defined at the country-level. These
indicators are placed on the horizontal axis of the different line plots; as ordered from
top to bottom Property, CPI, and Polity2. Figure 1 presents the marginal effect of
P Foreign on investment and Figure 2 presents the marginal effect of Foreign100 on
investment. These results show that the marginal effect of P Foreign and Foreign100
on investment changes along with institutional development (Property and CPI) but
remains fairly constant for different values of Polity2. In particular, the marginal effect
of P Foreign on Investment whilst negative at high levels of corruption turns positive
21 We also experimented using the natural logarithm of the ratio of investment in machinery,
equipment, land, and buildings over sales as the dependent variable. Analysis using this alternative
dependent variable supports the results of the analysis reported in Table 6.
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at lower levels of corruption (i.e. control of corruption). However, these marginal
effects remain close to zero and are insignificant. The marginal effect of Foreign100
on Investment is usually negative and significant. These line plots indicate that firms
that are completely foreign owned invest relatively more when these firms are located
in countries with better protection of property rights and control of corruption. In fact,
the negative marginal effect of foreign ownership is lower for countries that score high on
Property and CPI. This effect is not captured by the interaction term Foreign100 ×
CPI in the outcome model.
Finally, we interpret the random effects σP Foreign and σForeign100. In order to interpret
these random effects we assume that they have a normal distribution. Figure 5 in
Appendix A plots the distribution of the random effects (as well as that of the random
intercept) that are derived on the basis of model 2 of Table 6.22 Overall, the distributions
look approximately normal. Model 2 shows that the fixed effect coefficient of Foreign100
is equal to -0.47. The coefficients’ corresponding random effect parameter shows that for
95% of our sample population of countries the coefficient of Foreign100 falls within the
range of [-0.94, 0.00]. This result is derived as following: -0.47 ± 1.96 × 0.24. This
result suggests that, indeed in the majority of countries, the country-averages are that
completely foreign owned firms invest less than domestic firms and partially foreign-owned
firms. Using model 2 as a reference, the proportion of countries for which the average
slope is equal to or larger than 0 amounts to 2.51% (which corresponds to a z-score of
1.96). Following model 4, which uses CPI as a covariate, the random effect parameter
of Foreign100 suggests that on average in the majority of countries foreign-owned firms
invest less than domestic firms. Here, based on a normal distribution assumption, the
coefficient of Foreign100 for 95% of our sample population of countries falls within the
range [-0.78, 0.12]. This range includes positive values and as such suggests that, in
several countries in our sample, firms that are 100% foreign owned on average invest
relatively more. Given a z-score of 1.43, the percentage of countries in which foreign
owned firms invest the same or more than domestically owned firms is 7.58%. Model 6
yields somewhat similar evidence; i.e. in 14.92% of the countries’ foreign firms invest the
same or relatively more than domestically owned firms. Therefore, despite that foreign
equity ownership appears to be associated with relatively less investment, our results by
no means contradict the work of Koo and Maeng (2006) who on the basis of a country
case study (on Korea) argue that foreign ownership positively influences investment.
The coefficient of P Foreign in model 3 that uses CPI as a proxy is significant and
negative. Following model 3, the random effect parameter σP Foreign, the 95% range of
the coefficient for partially foreign-owned firms is [-0.77, 0.21]. Following this model, on
average, in 13.14% of the countries (i.e. about 10 countries) partially foreign owned firms
invest the same or more than domestically owned firms and completely foreign owned
firms. The coefficients of P Foreign in model 1,2,4,5 and 6 (i.e. including either Property
or Polity2 and/or including λ) are not significant and the coefficients are substantially
smaller in magnitude albeit the spread of σP Foreign remains wide. Altogether, this
evidence suggests that the point estimate coefficients of P Foreign are rather unreliable.
22 To save space we do not report the distributions of the random slopes for the other models.
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Table 5: Multilevel RE and outcome models with macro-level
covariates and interaction terms
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE Outcome RE Outcome RE Outcome
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign -0.06 -0.05 -0.23* -0.18 0.03 0.04
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07)
Foreign100 -0.33** -0.41*** -0.23* -0.29** -0.19** -0.24***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06)
Age -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.16***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Export 0.02 0.10** 0.02 0.09** 0.02 0.08*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Labour 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size -0.15*** -0.04 -0.15*** -0.06* -0.15*** -0.06+
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Openness 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Kaopen -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP -0.14* -0.14** -0.13* -0.16** -0.12* -0.11+
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Growth 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interest -0.00 -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
CPI -0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Polity2 -0.02+ -0.02+
(0.01) (0.01)
P Foreign × Property 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Foreign100 × Property 0.00 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00)
P Foreign × CPI 0.07* 0.06*
(0.03) (0.03)
Foreign100 × CPI 0.02 0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
P Foreign × Polity2 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Foreign100 × Polity2 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
λ 0.84*** 0.73*** 0.70***
(0.20) (0.19) (0.21)
Constant -0.13 -1.49* -0.36 -1.39* -0.60 -1.83*
(0.58) (0.67) (0.58) (0.65) (0.63) (0.73)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.31** 0.31** 0.31** 0.32** 0.31** 0.31**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
LR Chi2 439.1 449.3 472.2 481.5 442.4 446.9
LR df(1) *** *** *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Continued on next page
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# of firms 19978 19978 20143 20143 19571 19571
# of countries 77 77 76 76 72 72
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
Results for Labour, Age, Size and Foreign are available upon request
Table 6: RE and outcome random-coefficient models models with
macro-level covariates and interaction terms
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE Outcome RE Outcome RE Outcome
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign -0.07 -0.06 -0.28* -0.23 0.01 0.02
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09)
Foreign100 -0.38** -0.47*** -0.27+ -0.33* -0.20* -0.24**
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08)
Age -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.16***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Export 0.02 0.10** 0.02 0.09** 0.02 0.09**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Labour 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size -0.15*** -0.04 -0.15*** -0.06* -0.15*** -0.06+
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Openness 0.00+ 0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Kaopen -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
GDP -0.15** -0.15** -0.16** -0.18*** -0.13* -0.11*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Growth 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interest -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
CPI -0.03 0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Polity2 -0.02* -0.02*
(0.01) (0.01)
P Foreign × Property 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Foreign100 × Property 0.00 0.01+
(0.00) (0.00)
P Foreign × CPI 0.09* 0.08*
(0.04) (0.04)
Foreign100 × CPI 0.02 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
P Foreign × Polity2 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Foreign100 × Polity2 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
λ 0.84*** 0.74*** 0.71***
(0.20) (0.19) (0.21)
Continued on next page
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Constant -0.13 -1.46* -0.21 -1.25* -0.71 -1.93**
(0.55) (0.64) (0.55) (0.62) (0.60) (0.70)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
σP Foreign 0.27** 0.27** 0.25** 0.25** 0.30** 0.29**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
σForeign100 0.24** 0.24** 0.23** 0.23** 0.24** 0.23**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
συ 0.32** 0.33** 0.33** 0.33** 0.32** 0.33**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Joint LR Chi2 454.9 465.1 487.5 496.7 460.3 464.9
Joint LR df(6) *** *** *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
# of firms 19978 19978 20143 20143 19571 19571
# of countries 77 77 76 76 72 72
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
Results for Labour, Age, Size and Foreign are available upon request
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Figure 1: Conditional marginal effects of P Foreign on investment
Percentiles defined at the country-level.
Random coefficient models: Table 9 Models 2, 4, & 6
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Figure 2: Conditional marginal effects of Foreign100 on investment
Percentiles defined at the country-level.
Random coefficient models: Table 9 Models 2, 4, & 6
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6 Conclusion
In this study we have discussed how uncertainty related to irreversibility of fixed capital
in developing countries can hamper investment. In conformity with previous studies on
investment in developing countries we find that the high level of non-investment across
firms suggests that irreversibility of fixed capital is a strong obstacle to investment.
We further investigate the role of foreign equity ownership on investment behaviour
and find substantial evidence suggesting that there is a negative relation between foreign
ownership and firms’ level of investment relative to sales. More specifically, we find that,
on average, firms that are completely foreign owned invest relatively less in fixed capital.
We find weak evidence which suggests that firms that are 100% foreign owned invest less
frequently and we find no such evidence for partially foreign owned firms. This distinction
suggests that, under specific conditions, limiting foreign equity ownership could have a
beneficial effect on overall investment levels provided that such limitations on ownership
do not discourage foreign investors to enter the market and/or limit domestic industry
development. Further research is required to outline the specific conditions under which
foreign firms invest relatively less than domestically owned firms. Nonetheless, analysis
using random-effect models reveals that in a minority of countries there is, on average, a
positive relation between foreign equity ownership and investment.
The second major contribution of this study is the identification of the effect of
macroeconomic factors and institutions on investment behaviour. We find that such
determinants have relatively little explanatory power on the level of firms’ investment.
In comparison with this result, a country’s macroeconomic and institutional context has
a relatively higher impact on the probability that a firm invests e.g. in new investment
opportunities, replacement capital and/or restructuring. Further research assessing the
sensitivity of investment behaviour to a country’s macroeconomic environment in specific
(innovative) industries would enrich this understanding.
The overall lack of explanatory power of the macroeconomic indicators in our sample
of mostly developing countries may indicate that the ability of investors located in these
countries in forecasting expected revenues on the basis of macroeconomic signals is low.
Moreover, in some countries, markets are highly volatile and therefore macroeconomic
indicators can be poor predictors. Regardless of the underlying cause, should this
interpretation be correct, positive macroeconomic trends may fail to further stimulate
investment behaviour and markets may not be able to act as stabilizers and accelerators
or growth. The effectiveness of policy may also be limited in this respect. Darku (2000,
pp. 21) states that “the best way out is to ensure more policy credibility and stability
that will lead to a reduction in firms’ perceived uncertainty”.
Further research on the extent to which this pattern may be different in developed
economies could provide more insight on the way forward. For example, macroeconomic
predictors, such as growth and interest rates (as well as real estate markets and stock
markets) are generally considered strong predictors of investors’ confidence in developed
countries and, as a result, it is possible that the country-level effect on firm-level
investment is greater in developed countries. Previous research on the determinants of
firms’ performance suggests the contrary. Hawawini et al. (2004) decompose firm-level,
industry, and country effects on firms’ performance in six developed countries and find
that the country effect is small—smaller than the country-effect documented in this study.
Using a broader set of 37 countries, Burstein Goldszmidt et al. (2011) find similar levels of
country-effects as documented in our study and the authors argue that the country-level
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effect on firm performance is larger in emerging economies than in developed economies.
This research has had the ambition to close the gap between a macro approach
towards studying investment and a micro approach towards studying investment. We
have gained a preliminary understanding on the degree to which micro and macro evidence
on investment behaviour is complementary; e.g. in suggesting that control of corruption
is positively related to (the probability of) investment. The extent to which the negative
effect of political economy on firms’ investment levels is robust and/or can be explained
using a theoretical model may require further exploration. Moreover, the inability of this
study to explore investment dynamics has been a major limitation. Our application of a
multilevel, cross-country investment model can be extended with the exploration of the
dynamic relation between a firm’s past investment behaviour and firms’ outlook on future
investment. As a result of firm-level heterogeneity we expect that such research avenues
will be an important development towards better understanding investment behaviour.
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Table 7: Countries and Number of Firms
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Afghanistan 2007 356 142 15 1 242 94 20 91 110 155
Albania 2006 157 91 10 15 91 55 11 54 19 84
Angola 2005/09 685 265 95 35 498 150 37 376 21 288
Argentina 2005/09 1,627 1,110 90 152 514 648 465 1,175 39 413
Armenia 2007 238 120 17 7 133 72 33 83 23 132
Azerbaijan 2007 306 102 22 14 156 107 43 89 27 190
Bangladesh 2006 1,475 699 18 18 474 427 574 1,251 75 149
Belarus 2007 164 111 14 3 48 64 52 65 9 90
Benin 2008 71 35 7 5 43 20 8 27 5 39
Bhutan 2008 237 112 2 12 119 91 27 84 59 94
Bolivia 2005/09 594 362 54 35 292 209 93 342 39 213
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
2007 238 174 16 4 87 91 60 90 30 118
Botswana 2005/09 528 308 79 166 303 157 68 210 51 267
Brazil 2007 1,032 705 35 30 373 422 237 786 14 232
Bulgaria 2006/07 1,018 603 57 59 401 400 217 834 110 74
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Burkina
Faso
2008 262 134 22 12 159 70 33 73 32 157
Burundi 2005 268 153 6 41 221 41 6 139 12 117
Cameroon 2008 299 146 33 21 128 109 62 96 12 191
Cape Verde 2008 106 59 13 7 47 46 13 40 15 51
Chad 2008 111 71 14 17 61 37 13 41 14 56
Chile 2005/09 1,600 1,105 68 87 483 689 428 1,152 34 414
Colombia 2005/09 1,696 943 70 40 787 596 313 1,189 89 418
Costa Rica 2009 352 230 12 44 129 147 76 222 4 126
Cote d’Ivoire 2007 345 142 23 40 218 91 36 137 11 197
Croatia 2006 454 352 34 18 168 158 128 310 24 120
Czech
Republic
2007 160 127 16 13 53 65 42 68 15 77
Congo, DR 2005/09 542 250 33 64 401 109 32 273 25 244
Dominican
Republic
2009 305 139 22 31 95 113 97 103 13 189
Ecuador 2005/09 800 507 61 74 319 311 170 402 23 375
El Salvador 2005/09 789 439 57 62 305 293 191 469 39 281
Eritrea 2008 92 16 2 3 59 28 5 51 2 39
Estonia 2007 204 154 12 27 74 74 56 71 30 103
Ethiopia 2010 363 144 5 11 181 120 62 363 0 0
Fiji 2008 73 45 10 6 39 28 6 18 5 50
Gambia, the 2005 165 104 20 31 113 47 5 62 12 91
Georgia 2007 223 94 10 4 110 83 30 78 40 105
Ghana 2006 491 228 12 13 368 93 30 289 1 201
Guatemala 2005/09 811 439 37 61 304 293 214 513 44 254
Guinea 2005 220 122 8 16 196 18 6 134 7 79
Guinea-
Bissau
2005 154 60 5 10 136 17 1 77 5 72
Honduras 2005/09 520 207 32 30 256 162 102 288 48 184
Hungary 2007 252 120 23 29 78 88 86 99 25 128
Indonesia 2008 1,028 285 28 47 593 242 193 824 20 184
Iraq 2010 641 234 1 7 509 127 5 403 40 198
Jamaica 2009 245 86 19 8 113 106 26 87 8 150
Kazakhstan 2007 382 188 14 6 115 163 104 135 52 195
Kenya 2006 630 363 29 50 289 213 128 392 54 184
Kosovo 2007 130 68 0 0 93 31 6 45 16 69
Kyrgyz
Republic
2007 164 60 19 8 71 71 22 74 20 70
Laos 2007 353 87 20 43 165 123 65 142 13 198
Latvia 2007 206 178 20 26 67 65 74 69 24 113
Lithuania 2007 190 151 7 16 70 68 52 70 23 97
Macedonia 2007 272 191 26 13 102 117 53 96 41 135
Madagascar 2007 326 154 50 83 126 144 56 156 21 149
Malawi 2008 121 81 11 26 39 41 41 53 10 58
Mali 2006/09 574 224 20 20 476 90 8 329 11 234
Mauritania 2005 227 81 18 8 182 40 5 123 12 92
Mauritius 2007 299 182 14 23 145 111 43 140 14 145
Mexico 2005/09 2,464 1,011 128 104 1016 771 677 1,980 41 443
Micronesia 2007 52 31 7 4 36 16 0 9 3 40
Moldova 2007 295 175 24 11 106 122 67 94 32 169
Mongolia 2007 316 198 14 7 138 121 57 114 51 151
Montenegro 2007 69 50 2 2 32 26 11 24 3 42
Mozambique 2006 471 155 26 64 307 141 23 335 6 130
Namibia 2005 314 168 19 52 221 78 15 145 11 158
Nepal 2008 341 145 11 3 182 130 29 118 1 222
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Nicaragua 2005/09 516 191 22 26 302 165 49 344 16 156
Niger 2008 78 39 9 8 51 22 5 21 2 55
Panama 2005/09 511 239 20 39 287 163 61 249 78 184
Paraguay 2005/09 587 365 33 33 259 254 74 328 31 228
Peru 2005/09 1,301 869 101 68 475 506 320 887 22 392
Philippines 2008 909 338 138 95 297 411 201 665 18 226
Poland 2007 210 125 7 14 97 61 52 77 25 108
Romania 2007 253 178 20 18 81 82 90 91 30 132
Russia 2007 609 424 23 15 145 232 232 431 33 145
Rwanda 2005/10 289 119 16 34 195 79 15 146 8 135
Samoa 2008 63 38 10 6 45 15 3 16 5 42
Senegal 2006 505 141 20 11 418 66 21 259 3 243
Serbia 2007 329 227 25 22 110 109 110 123 39 167
Slovakia 2007 162 119 13 10 52 56 54 56 23 83
Slovenia 2007 242 216 21 19 92 74 76 90 35 117
South Africa 2006 936 388 40 81 373 371 192 680 15 241
Sri Lanka 2010 497 135 18 5 272 141 84 275 1 221
Swaziland 2005 288 158 14 91 205 54 29 101 31 156
Tajikistan 2007 244 88 19 2 120 83 41 83 39 122
Tanzania 2005 407 205 23 27 268 104 35 277 16 114
Timor Leste 2008 103 66 0 16 77 26 0 49 19 35
Togo 2008 109 50 14 26 67 28 14 22 13 74
Tonga 2008 133 69 21 2 118 15 0 50 1 82
Trinidad and
Tobago
2009 294 95 32 9 134 83 77 101 22 171
Turkey 2007 789 440 27 5 233 302 254 628 6 155
Uganda 2005 550 221 27 65 373 145 32 334 22 194
Ukraine 2007 488 249 30 5 193 179 116 339 20 129
Uruguay 2005/09 788 479 42 63 314 304 170 465 43 280
Uzbekistan 2007 336 116 42 6 117 133 86 111 36 189
Vanuatu 2008 92 69 11 24 58 34 0 7 19 66
Venezuela 2009 137 55 6 14 58 51 28 54 2 81
Vietnam 2008 927 631 45 86 221 370 336 693 52 182
Yemen 2009 276 116 10 0 178 72 26 150 1 125
Zambia 2006 479 185 38 78 270 146 63 301 4 174
Zimbabwe 2010 550 193 84 6 215 202 133 301 14 235
Total 45,480 23,651 2,739 3,028 21,225 15,228 9,027 27,075 2,483 15,922
Small firms have 5-19 permanent employees, medium firms 20-99 permanent employees,
and large firms 100 or more permanent employees.
Manufacturing includes leather, garments, textiles, food, metals and machinery,
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and other manufacturing industries.
Transport includes construction and transportation.
Services includes retail and wholesale trade, hotels, restaurants, and other services.
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Table 8: Definition of firm-level variables
Corresponding
variable
Data description
Investment Total annual expenditure for purchases of equipment and machinery in
last fiscal year
Total annual sales in last fiscal year
Foreign Individuals, companies or organizations that are privately owned and
have 10% or more foreign equity ownership
P Foreign Individuals, companies or organizations that are privately owned and
are partially foreign owned
Foreign100 Individuals, companies or organizations that are privately owned and
that are 100% foreign owned
Labour Total labor cost (including wages, salaries, bonuses, etc.) in last fiscal
year
Total annual sales in last fiscal year
Age In what year did this establishment begin operations in this country?
Export The percentage of the establishment’s sales that were: national
sales/direct exports/indirect exports
Size Number of permanent, full-time employees of this firm at the end of last
fiscal year
Land How much of an obstacle is access to land to the operations of this firm?
Finance How much of an obstacle is access to finance to the operations of this
firm?
Competitor How much of an obstacle are the informal sector competitors to your
operations?
Sector Industrial sector classification recoded to (1) leather, garments and
textiles, (2) food, (3), metals and machinery, (4) chemicals and
pharmaceuticals, (5) other manufacturing, (6) retail and wholesale trade,
(7) hotels, restaurants and other services, and (8) construction and
transportation
K Net book value of machinery vehicles, and equipment in last fiscal year
Source: ES
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Figure 3: Histograms of the Distribution of Investment to Sales
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Figure 4: Histogram of the Distribution of Foreign Ownership
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Figure 5: Histograms of the Distribution of δ̂1j, δ̂2j, and υ̂j
Random coefficient model: Table 9 Model 2
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8 Appendix B
8.1 Robustness Analysis for the Dependent Variable
This appendix presents the results of a sensitivity analysis that explores the effect of using
alternative dependent variables to capture the determinants of investment behaviour
(and/or aspects thereof). These results are comparable to the results of the probit and
outcome model that are presented in models 1 and 3 of Table 1. First, Model 2 of Table
9 presents the results using the natural logarithm of the ratio of investment to labour
costs (ln(I/Labour)) as the dependent variable. Both the probit selection model and the
outcome model (model 1-2) do not include Labour as an explanatory variable. Second,
model 4 uses the natural logarithm of the ratio of investment to capital (ln(I/K)) as
the dependent variable. Capital (K) is a measure of firms’ net book value of machinery
vehicles, and equipment. In terms of definition this dependent variable is a preferred
measure of investment. However, as a result of missing observations for K, the probit
selection model 3 and the outcome model 4 exclude the following countries in the analysis:
Benin, Bhutan, Cape Verde, Chad, Eritrea, Fiji, Malawi, Micronesia, Niger, Samoa,
Timor Leste, Togo, Tonga, and Vanuatu. Moreover, missing observations reduce the
sample used in the outcome model to 11,646 firms. Finally, model 6 uses the natural
logarithm of investment (ln(I)) as the dependent variable. The natural logarithm of
sales (Sales) is included as an explanatory variable in both the probit selection model 5
and the outcome model 6. Investment and sales is converted from local currency to US
dollar amounts using annual average official exchange rates from the World Bank, WDI.
This Heckman selection model excludes observations for the countries Ecuador (for 2009
only), Kosovo, Slovenia, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe because of missing data on exchange
rates.
We find no systematic differences between the probit selection models 1 and 3
presented in Table 9 with respect to the results presented in Table 1. In model 5 however,
the coefficient of P Foreign is negative but this coefficient remains insignificant. The
coefficient of Foreign100 turns significant and remains negative. And, the coefficient of
Labour turns positive and remains significant. These differences in the results are likely
to be the effect of including Sales in the model. The coefficient of Sales is significant
and positive.
We proceed by examining the differences between models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 9 with
respect to model 3 of Table 1. The results of the outcome models (2, 4, and 6) show that
the coefficients of λ are not significant; these Heckman selection models are not successful
in controlling for selection bias. Because a large number of firms are omitted in model
4 it is not surprising that the coefficient of λ (of model 4) is not significant. Another
difference is that the coefficient of λ in model 2 has a negative sign.
The results displayed in Table 9 provide some evidence suggesting a positive effect
of acquiring a foreign partner on investment. Following model 2 and 6 the coefficient
of Foreign P is positive and significant; in model 4 this coefficient is negative but
insignificant. The coefficient of Foreign100 is negative in models 2, 4, and 6 but is only
significant in models 2 and 4. The result presented in model 2 suggests that firms that
are completely foreign owned invest more in labour (in terms of wages) relative to fixed
capital. Overall, the results support the findings presented in Table 1 that suggest that
firms that are completely foreign owned invest relatively less in fixed capital formation.
Some additional notable differences are that the coefficients of Export and Labour are
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negative but not significant following model 4 and the coefficient of Size is positive and
significant in model 6. For the outcome models, the ρ are higher than 0.06 (which is
observed in model 3 of Table 1). In particular, analysis using the natural logarithm of
investment as the dependent variables (model 6) yields a ρ of 0.15. One possibility is
that this result is sensitive to the exchange rate conversion.
Table 9: Probit and outcome random-intercept models models
using alternative dependent variables
Invest ln(I/Labour) Invest ln(I/K) Invest ln(I)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Outcome Probit Outcome Probit Outcome
Selection Selection Selection
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign 0.04 0.07+ 0.04 -0.10 -0.01 0.15***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Foreign100 -0.02 -0.08+ -0.04 -0.16* -0.08** -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Age -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.08***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Export 0.18*** 0.06 0.18*** -0.07 0.15*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Labour -0.04*** -0.00 0.04*** 0.19***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.26*** -0.14*** 0.25*** -0.11* 0.14*** 0.25***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02)
Sales 0.11*** 0.62***
(0.01) (0.02)
Land 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Finance 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Competitor 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
λ -0.09 0.05 0.04
(0.23) (0.34) (0.19)
Constant -0.76*** -0.77** -0.84*** -0.54 -1.63*** 1.14**
(0.05) (0.28) (0.05) (0.42) (0.07) (0.34)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.36** 0.48** 0.36** 0.45** 0.36** 0.62**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Joint LR Chi2 2366.2 1255.1 2301.4 698.0 2224.1 1771.1
Joint LR df(1) *** *** *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.15
# of firms 45480 23651 44039 11634 43925 22871
# of countries 101 101 87 87 97 97
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
8.2 Robustness Analysis for Partial Foreign Equity Ownership
In this section we present the results of additional experimentation with the measurement
of foreign equity ownership. Specifically, we build on the analysis of Table 1 models
1 and 3 and use a set of dummies that identifies firms with different levels of partial
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foreign ownership using separate categories: firms with less than 50% foreign ownership
(Partial− 50: 1,182 firms) and firms with 50% or more than 50% foreign ownership but
not 100% foreign ownership (Partial+ 50: 1,557 firms). We also control for the effect of
Foreign100 on investment. These results are presented in Table 10.
When using this set of dummy variables we find no effect of foreign equity ownership
on the probability of investment (model 1). Moreover, the coefficients of Partial − 50
and Partial + 50 are also insignificant following the outcome model (model 2). Albeit
insignificant, the coefficient of Partial− 50 is positive and the coefficient of Partial+ 50
is negative. Still, we find no significant evidence which suggest that there is a non-linear
relation between partial foreign equity ownership and investment. In agreement with the
results previously discussed, there is a negative relation between Foreign100 and firms’
investment to sales ratio.
Table 10: Probit and outcome random-intercept models models
using an alternative measure for partial foreign ownership
(1) (2)
Probit Outcome
Selection
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
Partial-50 0.02 0.08
(0.04) (0.06)
Partial+50 0.06 -0.03
(0.04) (0.05)
Foreign100 -0.03 -0.21***
(0.03) (0.04)
Age -0.11*** -0.15***
(0.01) (0.02)
Export 0.17*** 0.07*
(0.02) (0.03)
Labour -0.04*** 0.44***
(0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.25*** -0.10**
(0.01) (0.03)
Land 0.14***
(0.01)
Finance 0.01
(0.01)
Competitor 0.04**
(0.01)
λ 0.41*
(0.21)
Constant -0.82*** -2.12***
(0.05) (0.26)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.36** 0.38**
(0.03) (0.03)
Joint LR Chi2 2388.8 916.6
Joint LR df(1) *** ***
ρ 0.12 0.06
# of firms 45480 23651
countries 101 101
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
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8.3 Regression Analysis by Sector
Variations in investment behaviour are partly attributable to industry and sector
specificities. The effect of foreign equity ownership on investment behaviour may also
be influenced by these specificities. In this section we control for the robustness of the
results of model 1 and 3 of Table 1 across sector. First, in models 1 and 2 of Table
11 we limit the sample to firms operating in manufacturing industries. Manufacturing
industries include leather, garments, textiles, food, metals and machinery, chemicals and
pharmaceuticals, and other manufacturing industries. Second, in models 3 and 4 of Table
11 we limit the sample to firms operating in service industries which includes retail and
wholesale trade, hotels, restaurants, and other service industries. Because we have no
data for firms operating in services in Ethiopia this country is excluded from the analysis
in models 3 and 4. The regression models 1-4 do not include sector dummies.
We find no significant relation between foreign equity ownership and the probability of
investment. Model 4, which is based on a sample of firms operating in service industries,
suggests that firms with partial foreign equity ownership invest relatively more than
domestically owned firms. Firms that are completely foreign owned invest less in fixed
capital relative to sales. The coefficient of Foreign100 in model 4 (services) is roughly
double the coefficient of Foreign100 in model 2 (manufacturing). For both models 2 and
4, λ is not significant. The magnitude of the ρ are comparable in size with the results
previously discussed on the basis of Table 1.
Table 11: Probit and outcome random-intercept models models by
sector
Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Services
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Outcome Probit Outcome
Selection Selection
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign 0.06 -0.03 0.07 0.14+
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Foreign100 -0.02 -0.15** -0.03 -0.31***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
Age -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.14***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Export 0.16*** -0.06 0.24*** 0.10
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
Labour -0.06*** 0.38*** -0.02* 0.56***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Size 0.24*** -0.13*** 0.28*** -0.15*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06)
Land 0.17*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.02)
Finance -0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Competitor 0.02 0.05*
(0.02) (0.02)
λ 0.03 0.30
(0.25) (0.36)
Constant -0.64*** -1.66*** -0.78*** -1.66***
(0.06) (0.29) (0.06) (0.45)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.38** 0.33** 0.38** 0.44**
Continued on next page
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(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Joint LR Chi2 1550.5 510.4 915.8 347.8
Joint LR df(1) *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.07
# of firms 27075 14420 15922 7601
# of countries 101 101 100 100
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
8.4 Robustness Analysis for Crisis
Finally we present the results of a robustness analysis that controls for the possible effect
of the financial crisis on investment behaviour. As a result of the financial crisis, the
economy in many developed countries has slowed down. Arguably, in developing countries
the effect of the crisis has been less severe. Yet, it may be possible to observe differences
in the determinants of investment behaviour when comparing investment behaviour in
pre-crisis years with the investment behaviour since 2008. In this section we seek to
establish the degree to which foreign investors behave differently in the years preceding
the recent financial crisis with respect to the ‘crisis years’.
The sample of observations is divided into a ‘pre-crisis’ sample (investment in fiscal
years 2005, 2006 and 2007) and a ‘crisis’ sample (investment in fiscal years 2008, 2009
and 2010). Rwanda is excluded from the ‘crisis’ sample because there are no firms in our
sample population that have positive investment in this country in the fiscal year 2010.
Because the sample of countries differs across the ‘pre-crisis’ and the ‘crisis’ sample we
cannot be certain that differences in results are attributable to the effect of the crisis.
The results are presented in Table 12: models 1 and 2 are based on the ‘pre-crisis’ sample
and models 3 and 4 are based on the ‘crisis’ sample. These analyses build on the random-
intercept models that include only the micro-level covariates.
The analysis based on the ‘pre-crisis’ sample does not indicate an effect of partial
foreign equity ownership on the probability of investment or on the investment to sales
ratio. However, the outcome model suggests that completely foreign owned firms invest
less than domestically owned firms. The analysis using the ‘crisis’ sample likewise suggests
that the coefficient of Foreign100 is negatively related to Investment. Model 3 also
indicates that P Foreign is positively related to the probability of investment.
Table 12: Probit and outcome random-intercept models models
(pre-crisis & crisis years)
Pre-crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Outcome Probit Outcome
Selection Selection
Fixed Effects (‘observed’ effects)
P Foreign -0.01 0.01 0.14** 0.11
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
Foreign100 -0.04 -0.23*** -0.02 -0.14*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Age -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.19***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Export 0.19*** 0.09* 0.12*** 0.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Continued on next page
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Labour -0.06*** 0.43*** -0.04*** 0.46***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Size 0.25*** -0.11*** 0.26*** -0.03
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06)
Land 0.15*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.02)
Finance 0.05** -0.06*
(0.02) (0.02)
Competitor 0.05** 0.04+
(0.02) (0.02)
λ 0.20 1.04**
(0.23) (0.37)
Constant -0.76*** -2.03*** -0.97*** -2.77***
(0.06) (0.27) (0.09) (0.52)
Random Effects (‘unobserved’ effects)
συ 0.36** 0.34** 0.42** 0.47**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Joint LR Chi2 1623.7 512.6 974.8 376.1
Joint LR df(1) *** *** *** ***
ρ 0.11 0.05 0.15 0.09
# of firms 29139 15574 16261 8077
# of countries 72 72 47 47
In parentheses are standard errors. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models contain sector dummies
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